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Burns v. Warden
597 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 2004)
L Facts
A jury found William Joseph Burns guilty of capital murder in the commis-
sion of rape and forcible sodomy and recommended a sentence of death.1 The
trial court then sentenced Burns to death.? In March 2001 the Supreme Court
of Virginia conducted its mandatory review of Burs's death sentence and
affirmed his convictions and sentences. More than a year later, on June 20,
2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Vitqinia.4 Atkins held
that executing the mentally retarded constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment"
in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 5
Shortly after Atkins, Bums filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court of Virginia claiming, interafia, that the Commonwealth could not
execute him because he was mentally retarded.6
On October 23,2003, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided that Burns's
mental retardation claim was not frivolous and granted his petition for a writ of
1. Bums v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 877 (Va. 2001); see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
31(5) (Michie 2004) (defining murder as capital if the murder takes place during the commission
of rape or forcible sodomy). The jury sentenced Bums to death because he posed a future threat
to society and his conduct was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." Burns, 541
S.E.2d at 877; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (stating the findings required for
a judge or jury to recommend death).
2. Burns, 541 S.E.2d at 877.
3. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313 (Michie 2003) (providing the procedures for the
Supreme Court of Virginia's mandatory review of death sentences). See general# Jeffrey D. Fazio,
Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 131 (2001) (analyzing Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va.
2001)).
4. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002). For a complete discussion and analysis of
Atkins, see generally Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 117 (2002) (analyzing Atkins
v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)).
5. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
6. Bums v. Warden, 597 S.E.2d 195,195 (Va. 2004); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654 (Michie
2000) (describing the procedures for seeking a writ of habeas corpus in Virginia state courts and
giving the Supreme Court of Virginia exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person sentenced to death); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.1 (Michie 2000) (listing the
provisions for filing a timely habeas corpus petition in a capital case with the Supreme Court of
Virginia); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Michie Supp. 2004) (providing the procedures for the
Supreme Court of Virginia to hear the mental retardation daim of a defendant who did not raise
the issue at trial and was sentenced to death before April 29, 2003).
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habeas corpus regarding that claim.7 The court dismissed the other issues that
Bums raised.' The Supreme Court of Virginia then remanded the matter for a
jury to determine Burns's mental retardation claim. The Warden of the Sussex
I State Prison ("Warden") sought a rehearing, asserting that the court should not
have given Burns the right to a jury determination on remand.1" The Warden
claimed that the court instead should have remanded the case for a judge to
determine Burns's mental retardation claim.11 The Supreme Court of Virginia
granted the Warden's motion for rehearing and temporarily vacated its prior
order to remand Burns's claim.'
2
II. Holding
On rehearing, the Supreme Court of Virginia reinstated its initial order
remanding the case for a jury to determine Burns's mental retardation claim.'3
The court found that Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 did not preclude a jury
from determining the claim and noted that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1
permitted a jury to make such a determination. 14 The court ordered the trial
court to conduct the jury hearing in accordance with various sections of the
Virginia Code. 5
7. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 195;seeVA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2 (permitting the Supreme Court
of Virginia to consider a writ of habeas corpus on a petitioner's mental retardation claim after
determining that the claim is not frivolous).
8. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 195.
9. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (Michie 2004) (requiring a jury to determine
whether the defendant is mentally retarded in a capital proceeding); see also VA. CODE ANN. 5 8.01-
654(C) (permitting the Supreme Court of Virginia to remand the case to the trial court that imposed
the sentence of death).
10. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 195.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 197.
14. Id. at 196; seeVA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) ("In anycase in which the offense may
be punishable by death and is tried before a jury, the issue of mental retardation ... shall be
determined by the jury as part of the sentencing proceeding required by § 19.2-264.4.").
15. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 197; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654 (Michie 2000) (allowing the
Supreme Court of Virginia to remand factual determinations that arise on habeas review). The
court instructed the circuit court to make its determination in accordance with the following
statutes: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Michie Supp. 2004) (instructing circuit courts to conduct
evidentiary hearings by order of Supreme Court of Virginia in habeas cases); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-10 (Michie 2004) (limiting sentence of defendant convicted of a Class I felony to life imprison-
ment upon finding of mental retardation); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-175 (Michie 2004) (governing
fees for court appointed expert); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 2004) (listing provisions
for obtaining court appointed expert when defendant's mental condition is relevant to capital
sentencing); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (Michie 2004) (listing procedures for determining if
capital defendant is mentally retarded); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2 (Michie 2004) (listing
provisions for appointment of expert when capital defendant's mental retardation is at issue); VA.
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III. Anaysis
On rehearing, the Warden argued that Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 only
permits the Supreme Court of Virginia to remand a mental retardation claim for
a jury determination when a defendant's case is on direct appeal.1 6 In opposition
to the Warden's argument, Burns claimed: (1) the language of the statute does
not preclude a jury from determining the issue of mental retardation when the
defendant raises the claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia; (2) allowing a jury to determine some mental retardation
claims and not others would violate the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) Ring v.
Arizona7 and Apprendi v. New Jersqy'5 require a jury to determine the issue of
mental retardation because the absence of mental retardation is a factual determi-
nation necessary for the court to impose a sentence of death.19 The court
proceeded to analyze Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 in terms of Bums's first
two arguments and did not discuss whether the Warden's interpretation of the
statute would violate Ring and Apprendi.-
To begin its analysis, the court stated that it would presume that Virginia
Code section 8.01-654.2 is constitutional and attempt to construe the statute "in
a manner that avoids constitutional infirmity."2' The court first analyzed the
Warden's interpretation of Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 under the Equal
Protection Clause.2 The court stated that the issue of mental retardation is a
factual determination for the jury to decide and held that the Warden's interpreta-
tion of the statute "would treat similarly situated persons differently in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause."' The court found it impermissible for a statute
to deprive some defendants of a jury trial on a factual issue solely because they
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:3 (Michie 2004) (placing limitations on the use of statements made by a
defendant during an evaluation); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2004) (explaining the
sentencing procedures for capital cases).
16. Bums, 597 S.E.2d at 196.
17. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
18. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
19. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 196; See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2
(providing the procedures for determining a mental retardation claim made for the first time on
appeal); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that a jury must make any factual
determination that may increase a defendant's maximum sentence); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466,477 (2000) (requiring a jury to determine whether a petitioner is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt for every element of the offense).
20. SeeBurns, 597 S.E.2d at 196-97 (omitting a discussion involving Bums's RingandApprndi
claims).
21. Id. at 196 (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Quillian, 571 S.E.2d 122, 126-27 (Va. 2002)).
22. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
23. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 196.
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exhausted their direct appeal and must raise their claim in a habeas corpus
petition.'- Thus, the court found that a statute would deprive an excluded class
of equal protection under the law by prohibiting a jury from determining defen-
dants' mental retardation claims based solely on when they raised their claims.25
The court observed that when a defendant raises a mental retardation claim
in a habeas corpus petition and the court finds that the claim is not frivolous, the
statute mandates that the court remand the factual determination of mental
retardation.26 However, the court found the statute silent on whether a jury shall
hear a defendant's mental retardation claim raised for the first time in a habeas
corpus petition.27 The court turned to Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1.1,
which requires a jury to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded when
the defendant's trial is before a jury.' Thus, the court found that Virginia Code
section 8.01-654.2 is constitutional because the statute does not preclude a jury
from determining a defendant's mental retardation claim raised in a habeas
corpus petition and the applicable statute does permit a jury determination of the
issue.29
Additionally, the Warden claimed that allowing a jury to determine the issue
of mental retardation would confuse traditional habeas procedures and introduce
the right to a jury determination where one previously did not exist.' The court
explained that its holding was limited to Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2, which
is a transitional statute implementing a new right available to a very limited
number of offenders. 31 Due to the statute's transitional nature and limited
application, the court concluded that providing the right to a jury determination
in this one instance will not alter traditional habeas corpus rules.3 2
IV. Application to Virginia Practice
Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 is still applicable when a defendant sen-
tenced to death prior to April 29, 2003 wishes to contest his death sentence
24. Id.
25. Id; see U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,").
26. Brns, 597 S.E.2d at 196; see VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Michie Supp. 2004) (instruct-
ing the Supreme Court of Virginia to remand for a factual determination of mental retardation upon
finding that a petitioner's mental retardation claim is not frivolous).
27. Buns, 597 S.E.2d at 196.
28. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (Michie 2004) (requiring a jury to determine
the issue of mental retardation when a capital case is tried before a jury).
29. Brns, 597 S.E.2d at 196.
30. Id at 196-97.




because he is mentally retarded.33 Defendants may raise their mental retardation
claims before the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal or through a
habeas corpus petition.' The Supreme Court of Virginia then will determine if
the mental retardation claim is frivolous.35 If it is not, the Supreme Court must
remand the claim to the trial court.36 On remand, a judge or jury will determine
the defendant's mental retardation claim depending on whether the initial trial
was held before a judge or jury.37 Thus, the procedural posture of the case does
not affect defendants' right to a jury determination of their non-frivolous mental
retardation claims as long as the defendants were sentenced to death prior to
April 29, 2003.38
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the Warden's contrary
interpretation of the statute would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
39 The
court's decision implies that any new statute giving defendants the right to a jury
determination of a factual issue may violate the Equal Protection Clause if that
statute does not provide a jury determination for everyone with a similar claim.4
A statute will survive an equal protection challenge "if the classification drawn
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."'" The court in
Burns implied that the Commonwealth's efficiency concerns in limiting the
frequency of jury trials is not "rationally related to a legitimate state interest" to
justify differential treatment.4 2 As long as the procedure does not result in a
gross inefficiency or affect a large number of cases, a statute may grant a tempo-
rary right to a jury trial for defendants raising a new claim on habeas review.
4 3




37. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 197; see VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (Michie 2004) ("In any case
in which the offense may be punishable by death and is tried before a jury, the issue of mental
retardation... shall be determined by the jury ... ").
38. When the Supreme Court of Virginia has denied defendants' petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus and the defendants have made their direct appeals, the defendants may only bring their
mental retardation claims in federal court. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2. Thus, the court's holding
is limited to cases in which defendants sentenced to death have not exhausted their direct appeals
or the Supreme Court of Virginia has not denied their habeas corpus petitions. Burns, 597 S.E.2d
at 196. The court's holding does not apply to mental retardation claims brought in federal court.
Id
39. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 196.
40. See id. ("To assign the finding of this fact to the trial court for one group of qualifying
defendants and to either a court or jury for another ... would treat similarly situated persons
differently in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.").
41. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
42. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 196-97; Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440.
43. See Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 197 (stating that the court's interpretation does not infringe on
2004]
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Thus, defendants may be able to challenge statutes on equal protection grounds
if the statute deprives them of a jury determination based solely on the proce-
dural posture of their case.
Additionally, the court's holding puts the final clause of Virginia Code
section 8.01-654.2 into constitutional uncertainty." Virginia Code section 8.01-
654.2 does not permit defendants to bring their mental retardation claims in state
court if they were sentenced to death prior to April 29, 2003, they have exercised
their direct appeal, and the state court has denied their habeas corpus petition.5
If the Commonwealth cannot deprive defendants of a jury trial based on the
procedural posture of their cases, it is arguable that defendants would have a
similar equal protection interest in bringing their mental retardation claims into
state courts. The Commonwealth's interest in not providing a mentally retarded
petitioner with a successive state habeas review is minirrial compared to the
burden it places on condemned individuals ability to assert their Eighth Amend-
ment rights.' However, as a practical matter, this provision may actually favor
condemned inmates because federal law provides relatively generous funding for
expert assistance to defendants seeking habeas review in federal court.47 Further,
defense counsel may prefer to bring their clients' claims before a life-tenured
federal judge, as opposed to a legislatively-elected state judge, given the potential
unpopularity of any finding of mental retardation that prohibits the Common-
wealth from executing an offender. Thus, attorneys may have little incentive to
challenge the final clause of Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2.
V. Conclusion
The court held that Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 was silent about a
defendant's right to a jury determination of a mental retardation claim initially
raised in a habeas corpus petition." Thus, any defendant whose trial concluded
prior to April 29, 2003 who raises a mental retardation claim on habeas review
or direct appeal may request a jury to determine his claim on remand if his
the traditional principle of not granting jury determinations on factual issues raised on habeas review
because the statute applies to a very limited number of cases).
44. See VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Michie Supp. 2004) ("If the person has completed both
a direct appeal and a habeas corpus proceeding under subsection C of § 8.01-654, he shall not be
entitled to file any further habeas petitions in the Supreme Court and his sole remedy shall lie in
federal court.").
45. Id.
46. See Walton v. Johnson, 306 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603 (W.D. Va. 2004) (expressing disap-
proval of the final clause of Virginia Code section 8.01-654.2 and observing that inconvenience to
the State could not outweigh defendants' interests in having the opportunity to assert their claims
in court).
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10)(B) (2000) (entitling defendants sentenced to death by either
state or federal court to the funds necessary for expert assistance).
48. Burns, 597 S.E.2d at 196-97.
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original sentencing was held before a jury. Further, Burns may open the door for
future equal protection challenges when a statute implementing a new right
grants a jury determination to some defendants seeking to invoke the right but
not to others.
Justin B. Shane

